Chapter 9
Hawaii Farm
WHEN THE BIG FIVE
CORPORATIONS first came to the Hawaiian Islands, they got the title to vast
amounts of land. At first, they used
this land to raise tropical crops for American markets. They needed people to do the labor and wanted
the cheapest workers they could find.
They went to China and found large numbers of people willing to work for
almost nothing. Most of their workers
came from China.
The Chinese wanted rice to eat and the islands had no native
rice. The companies allowed the workers
to bring seeds from China and plant the rice on land wasn’t suitable for the
crops the companies wanted to raise for export.
In the 1950s, the big five corporations became the owners of
large amounts of land in Central America.
This land was much closer to their markets in the United States and
shipping costs were far lower, so they moved their agricultural operations to
Central America. They sent the Chinese
workers in Hawaii back to China and began converting the farmland that had
raised tropical crops to other uses, mostly as sites for condominiums, homes,
golf clubs, and resort facilities.
The bogs and the swamps where the workers had raised rice
weren’t very desirable properties for these uses. The companies basically ignored them so they could focus on other
parcels with greater potential to generate revenue.
Rice kept growing on these lands, but humans didn’t harvest
it. The rice was left for other
animals.
Frances has been looking for land that former officials of
the company had ignored but that the company could use to generate
revenues. She found a parcel of land
that the company had ignored where rice grew.
This parcel is 1,500 acres in size, the same size as the Pastland
Farm. As of the early 21st
century, chemical contamination from genetically modified hybrid rice (which needs
chemicals to grow) was spreading throughout rice-producing lands all over the
world. Wealthy consumers wanted
uncontaminated rice and were willing to pay a lot more for it than they paid
for the standard varieties, which were likely to have at least some
contamination from the hybrids.
By the time our group took this trip, the uncontaminated
rice was getting very rare. As a
result, the price of uncontaminated rice was much, much higher than the price
of standard rice: by the time Frances did her study, pure, uncontaminated,
organic rice was selling for nearly ten times the price of standard rice. Since the big five corporations that ran
Hawaii never planted rice, they never brought the hybrids to the islands. The rice that grew in the bogs was pure,
uncontaminated, totally organic rice which would sell for ten times the price
as standard rice.
Organic
and hybrid rice:
Rice is an internal
pollinator, meaning that it pollinates itself from DNA inside of the
grain. Because of this, the standard
methods used to create hybrids for other plants (to move pollen from the male
plant to the flower of the female plant) didn’t work for rice. Rice therefore remained a pure and natural
crop until 1965, when Chinese scientists figured out how to get inside the
seeds, remove the male DNA that would otherwise pollinate the plant, and
replace it with external male DNA to make a hybrid.
The scientists found a hybrid
that produced double the yield as standard rice. Unfortunately, the hybrid couldn’t get enough chemicals from the
soil to grow so the farmers had to add massive amounts of chemicals to make the
rice grow. China was in the midst of a
horrific famine at the time. The
government built the plants and basically forced the entire country to switch
to the hybrids.
The owners of chemical
companies in the United States and Europe saw a great opportunity: if they
could get their people to switch to the hybrids, many new chemical plants would
be needed. They began offering free
hybrid seeds to farmers to get them to switch.
The farmers didn’t realize that, once they switched to the hybrids, they
would never be able to switch back to organic rice because the hybrids would
damage the soil so badly that the organics couldn’t grow. (Remember the bacteria that ‘fix nitrogen’
that Kathy smelled when she first woke up? The chemicals kill these
bacteria. The organic rice can’t be
grown without replenishing the health of the soil, which will take many
years.) This led to a one-way switch to the hybrids that spread
throughout the world.
By the second decade of the 21st
century, the chemical companies had figured out a new trick to increase the
demand for their product: they learned to modify DNA to create rice plants that
were totally dependent on chemicals. They began to mix some of this genetically modified rice with
regular rice, making all rice in areas they controlled dependent on
chemicals. (Environmental groups took
these companies to court and proved they had done it intentionally; the
chemical companies had to pay multi-billion dollar fines. But it was still worth it to them: the fines
were a one-time expense they could write off; the increase in demand for their
products continued year, after year, after year.)
The Hawaii farm doesn’t need
outside seed. Its crop is entirely
organic and uncontaminated. It can
reseed from its own crop. As long as it
is not contaminated, its rice will sell for many times more than standard
(contaminated) rice.
Several years ago, Frances began putting together an
operation so that the company could generate revenue from this land. She hired a professional farm management
company to monitor the land, determine when the rice was ready for harvesting,
call a harvesting company and get the rice brought to market, and arrange for
replanting so it will produce more rice next year. Each year, the farm produced 3.15 million pounds of organic rice.
Organic rice was selling for $1 a pound, so the land
produced $3.15 million a year in operating revenue. (The same as the Pastland Farm.) All of the workers and suppliers
that the management company hired to take care of harvesting and replanting
submitted their bills to the management company, which then submitted a single
bill each year to Castle and Cooke.
These bills totaled exactly $700,000 a year. The company paid these operating costs out of the operating
revenue and was left with $2.45 million a year, called the ‘operating profit’
of the Hawaii Organic Rice Farm. (This
is the exact amount of the operating profit of the Pastland Farm.)
The management company didn’t work for free. Each year, it submitted a bill to Castle and
Cooke for $50,000, the cost of the management services it provided. It did more than just manage the farm (tell
what the workers to do.) The management
company had accountants, bookkeepers, lawyers, computer coders, auditors, and
others working for them to make sure everything went smoothly. They charged a total fee for all these
services to Castle and Cook of $50,000 per year for this farm. They then paid the people who did these
things out of their fee.
After Castle and Cooke paid this bill, it had $2.4 million
of the money from the sale of the crop left over.
This was the free cash flow of the Hawaii farm. This is the amount of money Castle and Cooke
got each year from the land.
Note that this is the exact same free cash flow as the
Pastland Farm.
Different Ways to
Privatize Land
Frances has a Ph.D.
in the field of land tenure design.
She designs land tenure systems, including leasehold
ownership systems.
She is not a rice farmer, she has no interest in
farming, and has no time to devote to analysis of rice farming. Her department deals with thousands of
different kinds of properties. Most of
the properties her department deals with are residential, commercial, and
resort facilities, like hotels, condominiums, shopping malls, and housing developments.
Her department has ONE rice farm.
Often, the management company taking care of the Hawaii Rice
Farm has questions: it needs to know what Frances wants done with the waste
straw and other plant materials generated from farming, how to deal with birds
and pests that eat the rice, and other details.
Frances has a lot of properties to deal with. She can’t deal with the details of every
single property. This one is taking up
too much of her time. She needs to get
someone else involved with the property, preferably someone who will have very
strong incentives to make the decisions that would be in the best interests of
Castle and Cooke, take care of the land, keep it productive, and improve it if
this is possible.
She has a kind of standard leasehold system that she often
uses for properties that generate free cash flows. This works for residential properties, commercial properties,
resorts, golf courses, restaurants, and just about any other property she wants
under private control. In this system,
she sells the rights to the property in a way that causes the great bulk of the
free cash flow to flow to the company in the form of a leasehold payment.
Some of the free cash flow will be available for the
buyer of the leasehold to keep. Because
the buyer will be buying the right to some free money, the buyer will be
willing to pay a price. Frances wants
this to happen because if a buyer has to put up large amounts of her own money
in the property, she will have incentives to make absolutely sure that she
follows all of the rules and makes the leasehold payment as promised. (If she doesn’t do these things, her rights
to the property may be cancelled ‘without recourse,’ meaning that she won’t be
able to get back the price she paid.
People don’t want to lose money.
They will pay their leasehold payment and follow the rules to avoid this
loss.)
She looks over her portfolio and finds a golf course that
the company offers through leasehold ownership. The golf course charges people to play golf. They charge a lot because a lot of people
move to Hawaii specifically to play golf: the weather is perfect there almost
all year long. They use part of this
money to cover the cost of maintaining the facility. The rest of the money is the free cash flow.
This particular golf course generates a free cash flow of
$2.4 million a year. Frances created a
leasehold on this property and sold it under these terms: the buyer of the
leasehold would have to turn over $2 million of the free money to Castle and
Cooke each year as a leasehold payment.
This would leave the buyer with $400,000 a year in free cash. Interest rates were 4% at the time so the
buyer wanted to buy on terms that would generate a 4% return on the money they
invested. (If you pay a price for a
document that grants you rights to a golf course, you are investing your
money.) They realize that if they invest $10 million, they will get
exactly a 4% return on their invested money.
($400,000 is exactly 4% of $10 million.) Frances found a golf
course operating company that really wanted this particular course added to
their portfolio. (Hint: the company
name starts with the letter T, ends with P and has um in the middle.) The
company thought that, with its brand, it could charge more to get people to
play and make lots of money.
Since the golf course operating company would be buying the
right to $400,000 a year in free money, it could afford to pay $10 million for
the rights to the golf course. Frances
wanted this because she knew that, if the company had $10 million invested, it
would never be late on the yearly payment of $2 million. If it was late, Castle and Cooke could
cancel the leasehold ‘without recourse,’ meaning the operating company would lose
$10 million. No one would try to come
up with excuses for missing a payment of $2 million knowing that they might
possibly lose five times this amount ($10 million is five times $2 million), so
Frances was sure that the golf course operating company would never miss its
payments and never violate any of the rules that Castle and Cooke put in place
to protect the land.
You might intuitively realize that Frances could set up many
kinds of leasehold ownership systems that work differently. She could ask for an extremely high
leasehold payment (even higher than $2 million), transferring more of the free
cash flow of golf course to Castle and Cooke.
But if she did this, the buyer would be buying less of the free cash
flow and wouldn’t pay nearly as high of a price. For example, if she asked for $2.39 million, rather than $2
million, as a leasehold payment, the buyer would only be buying the right to
$10,000. At a 4% interest rate, the
most the buyer could pay for the price of the leasehold would be $250,000. (Why is this the most she could pay?
If she invests $250,000 to buy the right to $10,000, she will get exactly a 4%
yield on her invested capital. She
can’t pay more because if she paid more, her yield would be less. For example, if she paid $1 million, her
$10,000 yield would only be 1%. Since
she can get 4% in the market, it doesn’t make sense for her to accept only 1%
and Frances will not be able to sell the leasehold if she asks $1 million for
it with a leasehold payment of $2.39 million.)
Her company sells a lot of leaseholds and it has a division
that makes calculations to show what combinations of prices and leasehold
payments would work. This division
starts with the free cash flow of the land.
It calculates how much of the free cash will be left over and buyable at
each different leasehold payment that Frances may set. It then determines the price the
right to get this ‘leftover free cash’ will bring in the market, at the
interest rate in effect at that time.
This division creates a chart so that Frances can see her
options for the Hawaii Organic Rice Farm.
She can set a very high leasehold payment and therefore get a very high
percentage of the free money the land generates but get only a very low
price. She can set a very low
leasehold payment and therefore leave a lot of free money offered for
sale. Or, she can set something in
between, a system that will lead to a high leasehold payment and a very high
price. Here is the chart this division
gives her:
Chart 7.1
Amount of
Leasehold Payment Frances Sets
|
Price that
leasehold will bring in a market, if interest rates remain at current level
of 4% on farm loans
|
Amount of Free
Cash Flow Offered for Sale
|
Percentage of
free cash flow that will go to buyer
|
Percentage of
free cash flow that will still be owned by Castle and Cooke
|
$0
|
$60,000,000
|
$2,400,000
|
100.00%
|
0.00%
|
$1
|
$59,999,975
|
$2,399,999
|
99.99996%
|
0.00%
|
$1,000
|
$59,975,000
|
$2,399,000
|
99.96%
|
0.04%
|
$10,000
|
$59,750,000
|
$2,390,000
|
99.58%
|
0.42%
|
$100,000
|
$57,500,000
|
$2,300,000
|
95.83%
|
4.17%
|
$1,000,000
|
$35,000,000
|
$1,400,000
|
58.33%
|
41.67%
|
$1,500,000
|
$22,500,000
|
$900,000
|
37.50%
|
62.50%
|
$2,000,000
|
$10,000,000
|
$400,000
|
16.67%
|
83.33%
|
$2,200,000
|
$5,000,000
|
$200,000
|
8.33%
|
91.67%
|
$2,300,000
|
$2,500,000
|
$100,000
|
4.17%
|
95.83%
|
$2,350,000
|
$1,250,000
|
$50,000
|
2.08%
|
97.92%
|
$2,375,000
|
$625,000
|
$25,000
|
1.04%
|
98.96%
|
$2,399,000
|
$25,000
|
$1,000
|
0.04%
|
99.96%
|
$2,399,999
|
$25
|
$1
|
0.00004%
|
99.99996%
|
$2,400,000
|
$0
|
$0
|
0.00%
|
100.00%
|
She is eventually going to settle on the shaded line in the
middle; this give her the best combination of price and leasehold payment. Let’s consider why the other options aren’t
optimal to her, starting with the first line.
Frances can decide to sell a leasehold where the leasehold
payment is $0. If she does this, she is
essentially selling a freehold on the farm, not a leasehold. She is offering to sell the entire $2.4
million in free money the farm generates.
If she does this, she will get the price that a freehold on this farm
will bring, or the price that this farm would bring if it were sold in a state
that didn’t do leasehold ownership, like Texas.
Note that it would bring $60 million.
This is
the price that leads to yield of 4% on the invested capital. No one would pay more than this price
because, if they did, would get a lower yield than the 4% market
yield. For example, if you paid
$61,000,000, your yield of $2.4 million a year would only be 3.934%. Why would you accept a yield of 3.934% on
this farm when you could get a 4% yield in the market?
Of
course, a lot of people want to pay less and wish they could pay less. But they will bid against each other,
forcing the price up. If anyone can buy
it for less than $60 million, that person will get more than a 4% yield. This violates our starting assumption that
the market interest rate is 4%: if anyone could buy in a market and get more
than 4%, the market rate can’t be 4%.
If the market rate is 4%, a freehold on this farm can only sell for one
price: $60 million.
If you
want more information about pricing of freeholds on real estate, you can find
many college courses that explain it in detail (look for courses on ‘real
estate appraising’ or ‘real estate investing’).
Frances would like to have this $60 million for her
company. But there are two reasons she
isn’t going to choose this:
First, if she sells the land this way, she is selling a
freehold on the land. Castle and Cooke
doesn’t sell freeholds: if it sells a freehold, it loses its rights to this
land forever. The company wants to keep
its land forever. It is not going to
authorize her to sell a freehold on this or any other land.
Second, this option doesn’t bring in one dime of revenue for
the corporation. Frances works for a
company that wants revenue. The more
revenue she can generate for Castle and Cooke, the more the company will value
her as an employee. Each year, the
company shows how much it values employees with bonuses. Very valuable employees get multimillion
dollar bonus checks. Frances wants this
to happen to her. She wants a system
that generates some revenue for the company, so she isn’t going to choose this
option.
She could offer a leasehold with a leasehold payment of $1 a
year. Note that, if she does, she isn’t
going to get as high of a price. She
will only get $59,999,975, or $25 less than she would have gotten if she had
sold a freehold. (There is a reason for
these numbers; they are not made up but come from standard formulas which work
for very understandable reasons. See
endnote 2, at the end of the chapter, for an explanation.)
This will get her a $1 a year increase in the company’s
income. This is better than nothing,
but not much better. She can’t expect
the company to go crazy with their bonuses when they find she only increased
their income by $1 a year from a property that generates $2.4 million in free
cash each year.
Socratic Leasehold
Ownership
Frances goes down the chart until she gets to the
highlighted line. She can sell a
leasehold with a leasehold payment of $2 million a year. If she does, her appraisers say she can get
a price of$10 million.
This particular leasehold ownership system has a leasehold payment
that is exactly 20% of, or 1/5th of the price paid for the
leasehold. We will see that leasehold
systems that work to make this happen have certain very special properties that
no other leasehold systems have. I will
need a name to refer to leasehold ownership systems that sell property rights
with a leasehold payment that is 20% of the price, so I can refer to it in
discussions. I will call this kind of
leasehold ownership ‘socratic leasehold ownership.’
I want you to consider one important reason why this
particular leasehold ownership option might appear to be very attractive to
Frances:
Let’s say that someone buys a leasehold on this property for
$10 million. The buyer promises to pay
$2 million a year to her landlord. What
if the buyer gets lazy and decides not to collect the rice this year and not
make her leasehold payment? If she doesn’t make the leasehold
payment, she has violated the terms of her leasehold agreement and her landlord
can cancel the remaining term of the lease.
She will not get her $10 million back.
If someone buys this leasehold under these terms, you can be
very sure she is going to make absolutely sure she always makes her
leasehold payment on time and in full, without any need for anyone to notify
her or ask for any money. She knows
that if she doesn’t make this $2 million payment, she instantly loses $10
million. No sane person would miss a $2
million payment knowing that, if she misses it, she will be out five times this
amount of money.
You
could think of the price of the leasehold as having the same function as
a deposit would have in a regular long-term lease. If she makes her payments on time and
follows the rules the landlord sets, she can ‘get it back’ by selling the
leasehold to someone else; if the farm is in as good of condition as it was
when she buys it, she can get the same amount (we will see why this is true
shortly), so, from her perspective, it is the same as a deposit and, as we will
see, performs the same function. In
this case, the ‘deposit’ is 5 times the yearly ‘rent’ (the leasehold payment)
so no sane person would ever miss the ‘rent’/leasehold payment.
The buyer of the leasehold will make sure the leasehold payment
is made every year even if the farm doesn’t produce enough to make it. She has $10 million to lose if it is not
made and will sell her personal possessions, if necessary, to get the
money. She will borrow, if
necessary, to get the money. She will
sell her blood to a blood bank, if necessary, to get the money. If all else fails, she will find someone who
wants to buy the leasehold and sell it, always making sure the leasehold
payment is made. (Note: not all
leasehold ownership systems work this way, but the one that Frances set up in
Hawaii did work this way.) Frances wants to get this
particular property off her back so that she can worry about other things.
If Frances sells the leasehold under these terms, she will
never have to worry or lose a second’s sleep about possible problems that might
make her drive out to the farm to figure out why she isn’t getting paid. She will never have to do it. In fact, the company will actually come out ahead
if the leasehold payment is not made so they have no reason to even send
out a notice or ask for it. They might
even hope that the leasehold owner forgets.
Why? If the leasehold payment is missed, they can cancel
this leasehold and immediately sell another one for $10 million, which is five
times the amount of money they missed out on.
There is another reason that Frances likes this option: it
provides very, very powerful incentives for the leasehold owner to protect the
farm from damage and to repair any damage, at the leasehold owner’s own expense,
if it happens. Consider the reason: say
the leasehold owner has not taken any precautions against floods and a massive
storm floods the farm, doing $5 million worth of damage.
A renter or someone with no money on the line might just
walk away. But the leasehold owner is
NOT going to walk away. If she does,
she loses $10 million. If she can raise
the $5 million by any means, and fix the farm, she will still lose, but she
will only lose $5 million. If you have
ever lost large amounts of money, you will know that it hurts you a lot and the
loss will haunt you the rest of your life.
People are not going to take this risk if they can avoid it. There are things she can do to protect the
farm from floods. She is going to do
them. Although she is only doing this
to protect herself, her interests are the same as the interests of her landlord
in this case. (This is true if the
landlord is a giant corporation or if the landlord is the human race, as we
will see.) As long as the farm remains healthy and productive, the
landlords will get their money. The
leasehold owners will make absolutely sure that the landlord’s interests are
protected.
This system is designed
to align the interests of the leasehold owners with the interests of the
landlords. In socratic societies,
discussed later, the human race will be the landlord of the world. The interests of the people who own rights
to and control properties will align perfectly with the interests of the human
race. If they do the things that make
them money, they will make our lives better.
(This is what the term ‘aligned incentives’ means.)
If the leasehold owner can’t prevent the loss, the landlords
still aren’t going to suffer as long as she can fix the damage for anything
less than $10 million. There is very,
very little that nature can do to this farm that can’t be fixed for $10
million. The owners of this land
(Castle and Cooke, in this case) don’t have to watch the weather forecast and
wonder if their land is safe. The
leasehold owners will make absolutely sure that no harm comes to the land if
they can help it.
We will see that the price plays an important function in
leasehold ownership systems. They place
this money at risk. They will lose
this money if something goes wrong.
Frances particularly likes the socratic leasehold ownership system
because in this system the price is five times the leasehold payment. (If the leasehold payment is 1/5th
of the price, the price is 5 times the leasehold payment; this is saying the
same thing two different ways.) Since the leasehold owners always have
five times more money at risk than they have agreed to give to the landlords,
they will never leave their landlords hanging; the landlords will always get
every cent they have been promised, on or before the due date, and never even
one second late.
Even if the leasehold owner should somehow miss this
payment, Castle and Cooke (the landlords) still can’t lose. As soon as the payment is missed, they can
cancel the leasehold and will again own all rights to the property. They can then sell another leasehold
on the same property for another $10 million, getting 5 times more money
than they missed out on. The landlords
take on no risk whatsoever. Since they
take no risk whatsoever, they never have to collect anything, never have to
send out notices, never have to bother anyone.
They will always get their money.
We will see that this is a very important issue when the ‘landlords of
the Earth’ are the ‘members of the human race.’ Money will flow from the land,
to us, totally automatically, and totally without risk.
I
know that people will have a hard time understanding systems that give people
incentives to do things that protect outsiders, including the human race,
because these systems are very far from the systems that we live in. We will look at all of this later in great
detail; here, I am just trying to lay out the basics of a system that we know
is possible because it exists: many properties in Hawaii are held under the
exact same terms.
Systems Below Socratic
Leasehold Ownership in the Chart
Frances goes back to the chart that her analysis department
gave her (see chart
7.1, above, for details). She has
decided that she doesn’t want to use any of the systems above the shaded
line (the one that suggests she sells the leasehold for $10 million with a
yearly payment of $2 million). The
system at the shaded line has some great advantages. But what about the systems lower than socratic leasehold
ownership in the chart? If going down from the top brings ever-greater
advantages, why not keep going down, to the bottom of the chart, with the
assumption that lower is better?
She looks at options that are lower on the list, below
the shaded line, to see if they might be even better than the one that is
shaded.
She could get even more as a yearly leasehold payment
than $2 million by choosing one of these options. But if she does, she will have to worry about things that she
doesn’t have to worry about if her leasehold payment is $2 million. These problems come because the buyers of
the leasehold won’t have as much money at risk, and therefore won’t have as
much money to lose if they don’t make their payments or if something damages
the farm.
To see this, consider the next to last line on the
chart. Frances could offer a leasehold
on this farm with a yearly payment of $2,399,999. If she does, she won’t be able to get much as a price. The buyer is not going to be buying the
right to get the full $2.4 million in free cash flow. She is only buying the right to whatever free cash the farm
produces that she doesn’t have to give to the landlord. In this case, she has to give all but $1 a
year of the free cash flow to the landlord, so she is only really buying the
right to get $1 a year in free cash.
The standard formulas show that a person buying the right to get $1 a
year in free cash is only going to pay $25 for it, if interest rates are
4%. (This is the price for buying a $1
cash flow that generates a 4% return on the invested money; if you want more
information, see notes 1, 2, and 3, at the end of the chapter.)
In the socratic leasehold ownership system (the one marked
by the shaded line) the buyer had to invest $10 million in the property
by paying $10 million as a price; the buyer had $10 million to lose if
she didn’t make her $2 million yearly payment.
No one would ever miss an $2 million payment knowing they would lose $10
million if this happened.
But in the second to the last line system, the buyer only
paid $25 for the leasehold. At the end
of the year, she will be sitting there with $3.15 million in her hands. She might feel honor bound to pay her
workers and suppliers, and if she does, she will be left with $2.45
million. Her contract with Castle and
Cooke requires that she give Castle and Cooke $2,399,999 of this money. If she does this, she will wind up with $1,
for a year of work with $25 of her own money invested.
What if she doesn’t make this payment?
What if she keeps the entire $2.45 million?
If this happens, Castle and Cooke will cancel her
leasehold. She will immediately lose
$25.
But why care about this? She has $2.45 million. Perhaps Castle and Cooke will file a suit
against her and try to get this money.
But she can easily use a pretty standard excuse for people who get money
that that doesn’t belong to them: it is gone.
She had some bills and spent it.
If she doesn’t want to make this excuse, she can simply open an account
in Switzerland, wire the money to that account (at the rate of $10,000 per day,
to avoid reporting to the IRS, which happens if you wire more than this), and
then move to some other state.
Frances realizes that the price acts like a deposit
to the buyer of the leasehold. If she
offers the rights to the farm under the terms on the second to the last line,
the buyer is basically posting a $25 deposit to protect a $2,399,999 million
yearly payment. It just doesn’t make
financial sense to make this payment if all you lose for not making it is $25.
I consider myself pretty honest, but I would have to think
pretty hard about this situation if it were me. Should I keep the full $2.45 million, get myself to Switzerland
where I could put the money into a bank and live in luxury on the interest my
money will generate for the rest of my life.
(At 4% I will get $98,000 a year; since Switzerland doesn’t tax interest
for foreign nationals and doesn’t report it to the United States so the IRS can
tax it, this will be tax-free.) Or should I be honest and make my
payment, leaving me with only the $50,000 that I need to justify the work on
the farm and a $1 return on my $25 investment? It is a hard choice. I think a lot of people would be on the next
plane to Switzerland.
Frances doesn’t want people to get into a position where
they will make more money defaulting on their payments to Castle and
Cooke than they would make if they kept their promises. True, perhaps she will get an honest person
who will pay. But perhaps not. Why take the chance? She can avoid
this problem entirely by choosing one of the other leasehold ownership systems,
one that is higher on the chart.
If Frances wants to protect her company’s interests, she is not
going to sell with options that are either very high or very low on
the chart. The options close to the top
don’t get her company enough money over time to make it worthwhile; the options
close to the bottom don’t give her company security and safety and don’t give
the leasehold owners incentives to work hard to protect the interests of the
landlords. The only leasehold systems
that make sense are those close to the shaded line on the chart.
In this example, Frances has been in the field for many
years. She has sold a lot of
leaseholds. She has been studying land
tenure systems for her entire life. She
manages thousands of leaseholds for Castle and Cooke and knows how they work. She isn’t going to waste a lot of time; she
knows what works and want doesn’t. She
knows that the option called ‘socratic leasehold ownership,’ the one on the
shaded line of the chart, creates the particular set of incentives she wants to
create. (Again, don’t worry if you
don’t get this now: this is a complicated issue and I just want to introduce it
here; we will go over the details in the far simpler system in Pastland, when
we sell an identical leasehold ownership there.)
The Sale of the Leasehold
She calls her company’s real estate agent and says she wants
to put a listing on the property. She
will offer it on these terms:
1. Price: $10
million.
2. Leasehold
payment: $2 million a year.
A Different Perspective
Now let’s change perspective a to see why a person buying
a leasehold might like this particular system too:
Imagine that you have just moved to Hawaii and are
interested in possibly getting some property.
You have some experience in farming and would like to find a farm where
you could tinker around a little, be in touch with the land, and possibly make
some money.
You decide that you don’t really want a very small
farm (one that is only a few acres in size, or a ‘garden farm’) because you are
experienced with operating a farm that is 1,500 acres in size. You know how to make things work on a farm
this size. You know how to find
contractors to bring in the harvest and how to negotiate prices, fees, and
contracts. You know how to monitor
contractors and draw up contracts that make sure they perform. You know about planting, negotiating the
sale of production, and other details of a farm that is this size. You don’t want a few acre ‘garden farm’
because you don’t know anything about putting together the workers and getting
things done on a small farm. You are looking
for something at least 1,000 acres in size.
You call a real estate agent and she tells you there is a
farm that is ‘in the pipeline.’ The agent has put up a notice on internet
websites that post farms for sale (most common is Loopnet.com) that a farm will
soon be listed but hasn’t listed any details.
On the notice, this farm is called this the ‘Hawaii Organic Rice Farm.’
It produces $3.15 million worth of organic rice a year. The farm has operating costs of $700,000 so
it makes operating profits of $2.45 million a year. The farm has been under professional management for five
years. The current owner, Castle and
Cooke, has paid the management company $50,000 a year for its services. In exchange for this money, the managers
arrange contractors to do all of the work (the management company doesn’t do
any work itself), makes sure production gets sold in a competitive bidding
process, takes care of all the paperwork, and has an outside auditing firm come
in to make sure that the people who deal with money, equipment, and anything
valuable associated with the farm are all being honest and accounting for
everything properly.
After all these costs, the company is left with $2.4 million
a year. This is the free cash flow of
the farm. If you go to any site that
offers rights to farms for sale in our world today (on any terms at all) you
will see that the free cash flow is a very important number to buyers: most of
the ads put the amount of free cash flow the land generates in the headline of
the ad.
You drive out and look at the farm. There is no one onsite at the time; you just
walk around and look at the land to see if the ad has represented it
properly. You call the management
company and set up an appointment to examine their books. You find all the numbers are exactly as
claimed. You tell the real estate agent
that you might be interested, depending on the terms of the deal.
The agent calls you the next day and says that the terms are
this: the owner is offering a perpetual leasehold on this property (perpetual
means ‘no termination date’). You will
have to pay $10 million as a price to buy the leasehold and a $2 million
leasehold payment each year you own the leasehold. This particular leasehold has an unusual provision called an
‘option to sell the leasehold back to the seller:’ Castle and Cooke will
buy back the leasehold at any time for the full $10 million you paid for it,
provided the farm is in as good or better condition as when you bought.
If you buy this leasehold and then later change your mind,
you can basically return it to the seller and get all of your money back, at
any time.
Is this a good deal for you?
There are two ways people can pay the price that they
have to pay to purchase property rights.
They can pay it with money they already have in their pockets, or they
can borrow the money with a mortgage.
Let’s consider both options to see how the numbers look. We will start with what would happen to you
if you already had the money and could pay cash.
A Cash Purchase of the
Leasehold
Say that you have $10 million in a money market fund paying
4%. You get $400,000 a year in returns
on this money.
If you take $10 million out of this fund to buy the
leasehold, you will no longer be getting the $400,000 a year in returns that
you now get. But after you give this
$10 million to Castle and Cooke as the purchase price of the leasehold, you
will own the right to keep all but $2 million of the $2.4 million free
cash flow this farm produces. If it
continues to produce as it has in the past, you will wind up getting $400,000 a
year, exactly enough to replace the $400,000 in returns you had been getting on
this $10 million before.
You will basically break even on this part of the
transaction. You had been getting a 4%
yield on your money. You will still
get a 4% yield on your money, you will just get it from the income of the farm,
not from the investment fund.
If you had left your money in the investment fund, you could
take it out any time you wanted by selling your shares in the fund. If you put your money into the farm, you can
also get it back any time you want by selling your interest in the farm. (Castle and Cooke has agreed to buy it back
for the same amount if you ask for it.)
The farm is currently under management. The managers don’t do any physical labor on
the farm. They just have a database of
suppliers; they monitor the farm and, when something needs to get done, they
call the appropriate supplier. They get
$50,000 a year for this. If you want,
you can leave it under management. If
you leave it under management, you will have to continue to pay them.
However, your entire reason for looking for property is that
you want to manage it yourself. You
intend to go to the farm frequently.
You will deal with the contractors yourself. You will take care of selling the rice the land produces yourself. You will write the checks and audit the
books yourself. You have experience in
these things. If you are working for
yourself, you have stronger incentives to make sure you get the best prices
than the management company does: the employees of this company don’t really
care how much things cost, because they don’t pay the costs. You will pay these costs and you think you
can manage the costs much better than the disinterested management company. If you can keep costs down, or do things
that drive up revenues, you will get all of the additional revenues. You will also save $50,000 a year on
management. This is a lot of money for
doing something you already know how to do and which you know will only take a
few hundred hours each year.
The real estate agent tells you that there is another way to
make money from this land. You can
improve it. You saw for yourself, when
you went to the land, that the land has never been leveled. There are high spots and low spots, neither
of which produce the amount they would produce if they were exactly the right
level. You can level the land and
production will go up. You can keep all
additional money. Quite often, leveling
rice land causes production to go up by 20%.
If this happens, you may end up with hundreds of thousands of dollars a
year in income. Your leasehold payment
will not go up: it is locked in and will never change as long as you own the
leasehold. You will be able to keep all
of the additional money the farm generates.
The real estate agent tells you that if you improve the
farm, you can offer the leasehold for sale in the market and it will bring more
money. In this system, the amount
people are willing to pay for leaseholds depends on the free cash flow. If the free cash flow is 20% higher, and the
terms of the leasehold remain the same, you can sell the investment for 20%
more than you paid for it, leading to a $2 million gain. (We will look at examples below to show why
this is true.)
Here is the bottom line:
If you buy the leasehold on the farm, you can get your $10
million back any time you want by taking advantage of the option to resell the
farm. This is really no different than
your current deal, with the money in the money market fund.
If you leave the money in the farm, it will generate a 4%
yield, the same yield you get on the money market fund.
If you don’t want to manage the farm, you don’t have to: the
management company is happy to take it over any time.
If you want to manage the farm, you will make $50,000 a year
from this, plus any increases in profits that you can create by driving up
production or reducing costs.
If you own the leasehold, you can improve the farm and may
possibly wind up with hundreds of thousands of dollars a year without doing any
additional work in the future.
If you improve the farm you can then sell it and pocket $2
million, increasing your wealth by an enormous amount.
If you have enough money to pay cash for the farm, this is
clearly a very good deal: you get all of the benefits you want, and really
don’t have any downside, as long as you take care of the farm and keep it in
good condition.
What if you aren’t rich?
If you don’t have the $10 million, you will have to borrow
it. At the time, interest rates are 4%
so, if you borrow, you will have to sign a loan agreement that requires you to
pay $400,000 a year to the lenders as interest.
If you take over management, you will end up with a $50,000
a year income for yourself. If you can
cut costs or drive up revenues, you will get more. There is no limit to how much you can make.
If you level the land, your income will go up by whatever
extra cash flows you generate. If you
drive up production and costs by 20%, you will end up with $500,000 in
additional income each year you own. If
you decide to sell, you can sell for $12 million. You can use $10 million to repay the loan and be left with a $2
million gain.
Is this a good deal? I hope you can see that Frances
isn’t really taking any chances here: someone will definitely buy this leasehold. She added the option to resell the leasehold
to Castle and Cooke as an extra attraction: since people know that they can
always sell the leasehold for $10 million, they never have to worry about the
leasehold to this farm falling in value. Investors love this: it is very nice be offered the right to gain
money but be protected from loss.
Lenders also love it: they know that, if they should have to repossess
the farm, they will be able to sell it for $10 million, so they aren’t very
likely to lose any money on this farm.
Everyone wins.
And that is the general idea of this system. It is possible for everyone to win because
the world gets richer each year due to the existence of this farm. If Frances sets up the land tenure system
right, everyone will win.
Land Tenure Systems
Now that we are in Pastland, Frances is going to be in a
position to design a land tenure system for the benefit of the human race. She understands how to align the incentives:
to her, the alignment of incentives is a technical task. She can work out the incentives that would
exist with each possible land tenure system that she might design. She can figure out the interests of the
human race and design a system that has the closest possible alignment between
the ‘incentives of the people who control the land’ and the ‘interests of the
human race.’ This is what she has done her entire life.
In our 21st century Earth, the land tenure
systems were not designed to meet the needs of the human race. Most of the land tenure systems were not designed
at all: they came to exist after warlords conquered land and used it entirely
for the benefit of the warlords (who became ‘kings’ and were eventually deposed
by ‘governments’ which took over the flows of value that had gone to the warlord-kings),
or they were designed to meet the needs of certain corporations (like Castle
and Cooke). In a way, we can be
thankful that these companies existed because we can study the tools they used
to get private individuals who did not own the land to make truly massive
investments in the land they controlled, without having to ever sell any of the
land to any of the improvers.
Our group in Pastland can take advantage of these
things. As long as the moratorium is in
effect, we have a natural law society.
Once the moratorium ends, we may create any kind of land tenure system
we want, including one that grants partial rights to private buyers provided
they agree to rules we have passed to protect the land, and provided they share
the bounty the land produces with the members of the human race.
What If You Don’t Pay Cash
And Have To Borrow?
If you don’t have the $10 million, you can borrow the
money. If interest rates are 4%, you
will have to pay $400,000 a year in interest.
You will also have to make the leasehold payment of $2 million to Castle
and Cooke, so you will pay out $2.4 million of the $2.45 million in profits to
others.
If you keep the farm under management, you will also have to
pay $50,000 a year to the management company.
But, again, in this example, you intend to manage it yourself. If you take over management, you will gain
an income from the farm of $50,000 a year.
You will have to manage. But it
won’t be really a very difficult or time-consuming job for you. You will basically have to make a few phone
calls, do a little paperwork, and make sure everything goes smoothly.
You can also make the improvement. If you do, you will gain the same benefit you would have gained
if you had paid cash for the farm. Say
that you level the land and all the numbers (costs and revenues) go up by
20%. The profits go up to $2.94
million. You will be paying $2.4
million a year as payments ($2 million as a leasehold payment and $400,000 as
interest on the loan you took out to pay the price). You will be able to keep the other $540,000 a year in operating
profits.
After you improve, you could also sell the leasehold for the
same $12 million, leading to the same $2 million gain on the sale.
Either way, you will be able to get a $50,000 a year net increase
in your income by buying the leasehold and managing the farm yourself. You can improve the land and will get the
same benefits from improvements whether you have cash to pay for the leasehold
or have to borrow.
The ending numbers are the same whether you pay cash for the
leasehold or borrow, we just get there by a little different way.
Of course, if you aren’t rich, this is going to be a
more attractive deal. Why? If you
are a multi-millionaire, you may want to dabble a little in the farming, but
you aren’t going to really care much about the $540,0000 per year you can gain
through improvements. So what? You can
already have everything you want. If
you aren’t rich, that $540,000 is going to be a huge ‘invisible hand’ pushing
you to get the improvements made as quickly as possible. Most people (those who aren’t already
multi-millionaires) will stay up nights just thinking about this. They will make the plans as they go to sleep
and dream about the workers moving dirt from spot to spot. They will be there before the workers show
up in the morning to move the dirt and make sure they do everything exactly
properly. Chances are that someone who
is not already very rich is actually going to buy this leasehold, because the
money that can be made from improvements is going to be a bigger draw for these
people. But the point here is that, in
the end, the actual incentives are the same for rich people and poor
people. They have incentives to
take care of the land, to protect it from harm, to make absolutely sure
that the share of the free cash flow that belongs to others (the leasehold
payment, which belongs to Castle and Cooke) gets where it is supposed to go,
and to improve the farm if they can do this.
Frances set up the leasehold ownership system specifically
to make sure all of this happened. As
we saw earlier, she had a lot of choices.
She could have set up leasehold ownership systems that had higher
payments to Castle and Cooke but didn’t give Castle and Cooke as much in
security. She could have set up systems
that gave Castle and Cooke even more security than they had now, but at the
expense of lower payments to Castle and Cooke.
She chose this one because it was a kind of Goldilocks system, from her perspective:
it aligned the interests of the buyer/owner of the leasehold with the interests
of Castle and Cooke in a perfect way.
Details Of Socratic
Leasehold Ownership
What about the buyback option?
Why did Frances put this option into the system?
We will see, later in this book, that the buyback option is
a key provision in socratic leasehold ownership systems. If we, the members of the human race,
include it, we will never have to worry about many things we otherwise would
have worried about and we will guarantee an orderly and ‘liquid’ market
for leaseholds. We will know that they
will always sell, very quickly, and will have a reserve of funds that we can
use, if necessary, to deal with any problems that may possibly come up
in production.
Let’s consider why Frances included this provision:
First, she wanted the leasehold to sell quickly.
If not for the buyback agreement, people may have wondered
about the price. Is it too high?
They don’t want to pay a price that is more than the market value for the
leasehold because, if they do, and they ever want to sell, they may not get
their money back.
With the buyback agreement buyers don’t have to worry about
this. The market value of the leasehold
cannot go down as long as they keep the farm in at least as good of
condition as when they bought. If you
buy this leasehold and, a week later, you decide you made a mistake, you can
basically return the farm to the seller and get your money back, just as if the
farm were an item you bought at Walmart that you decided you didn’t want. Adding in a ‘money back guarantee’ is going
to make people realize they don’t have to worry about whether the price might
be too high: if they find it is, they can always ‘return’ the farm and get
their money back. Since there is no
limit on the time for the buyback agreement, they can do this in a year, a
decade, or at the end of their life if they want.
The money back guarantee is also going to make lenders far
more willing to make a mortgage on the loan.
Lenders can lose money if the price of the thing they are lending on
falls. In 2007, the housing markets
collapsed in large parts of the world and housing prices collapsed. If your house is worth less money than you
owe on it, it is better just to walk away: why pay more for the house than it
is worth, by continuing to pay the mortgage? Lenders lost trillions of
dollars when this happened and the result was a collapse in the lending market
(it doesn’t make sense to lend money in a situation like this).
Why
do markets collapse? The problem is that there is really no true or
correct value for the pieces of land in a freehold system. What is the Hawaii Farm ‘worth?’ It
will produce $2.4 million a year in free cash flows forever. How much is $2.4 million times infinity? The
farm will produce food for humans as long as there are humans. How much is it worth to the human
race? Clearly, there is no finite amount of value that can match
the value of a piece of productive land: no pile of pieces of paper with
numbers on them or metal disks, no matter how large, would ever truly
compensate the human race for the loss of a part of the planet. There is no true value.
If
there is no true value, then any value set in markets can only be
artificial. It is a made-up
number. In practice, this made-up
number is determined mostly by something called the ‘money supply’ at the
time. If there is a lot of money in the
economy, it can support very high prices; if there is less money in the
economy, prices have to be low. The
problem is that the amount of money in the system changes from day to day due
to very complicated factors. If the
money supply falls, prices of real estate fall, and vice versa. Because the price of the land is artificial,
when prices start to fall, people start to panic (a low artificial price makes just
as much sense as a high one) and they start to sell, trying to get their
properties sold before the price collapses.
Of course, this leads to a glut of properties on the market that drives
down prices.
Leasehold
ownership systems work differently, setting prices that actually mean
something. (In this case, the price is
an exact multiple of the free cash flow.
With the leasehold payment at 20% of the price and the interest rate at
4% of the price, the price must be exactly equal to the free cash flow divided
by 24%. This must happen because it is
the only affordable price that is also ‘not too high’ (not so high that
a person buying a property will get a windfall). This is a complicated topic that I will discuss later and in
great detail in other books in this series, but as long as there is a buyback
agreement in place, no one has to worry about it: prices can’t go down after
the sale so lenders never have to worry about the market value of the
collateral falling below the value of the loan. As long as they make sure the owner keeps the property in good
condition, this can’t happen.
The other reason Frances set up the system in Hawaii with a
buyback option was that she wanted security.
She wanted to protect herself and her boss.
The socratic leasehold ownership system has a price that is
always 5 times the leasehold payment.
This system works very much like a rental with a deposit system where
the deposit is 5 times the rent. When
Frances sells the leasehold, she can’t simply give the $10 million to Castle
and Cooke to spend. She may have to
give this money back, so she has to hold it in a reserve fund. If the leasehold owner wants the money back,
Castle and Cooke must have it available to pay.
What if the leasehold payment is missed? If this
happens, the leasehold owner will have violated the terms of the leasehold and
the leasehold will simply expire. The
(former) leasehold owner will lose all rights.
She will not have any right to ask for the $10 million back: as
soon as she missed her leasehold payment, she gave up this right. The company will get all rights to the farm
back, just as if the leasehold had never been sold. But the company will have $10 million sitting in a reserve fund
that it no longer has to hold; there is no longer any chance it will have to
use this money to buy back a leasehold, because it already owns the
leasehold. This money is just
extra.
Before the leasehold payment was missed, this money didn’t
really belong to Castle and Cooke.
The leasehold owner could ask for it at any time, so it really belonged
to the leasehold owner; Castle and Cooke was simply holding it in reserve. The very second the leasehold payment is
missed, however, this $10 million belongs to Castle and Cooke.
Let’s say that the contract requires the leasehold payment
to be made by 1:00:00 PM on the first business day of November of each
year. This money must be paid into ‘the
working account of Castle and Cooke’ in cleared funds to be considered paid.
Say that the first of November is a business day. At 12:59:00 PM on November 1, the $10
million is still in reserve; it doesn’t belong to Castle and Cooke. At exactly 1:00:00 PM, the computer checks
to see if the leasehold payment is in the working account in cleared
funds. If it is, nothing changes: the
$10 million must remain in reserve. If
the money is not there, the computer realizes that the reserve account has a surplus
of $10 million. It has $10 million in
the reserve account but will never have to buy back the leasehold to the Hawaii
Farm, because the farm is no longer private.
The computer transfers the ‘surplus reserves’ to the ‘working account of
Castle and Cooke.’
This means that, by 1:00:00PM on the first business day of
November each year, one of two things must happen: either the $2
million leasehold payment will appear, as if by magic, in the working account
of Castle and Cooke, in cleared funds, ready for the company to spend, OR $10
million will appear in the working account of Castle and Cooke, ready for
the company to spend. It is not
possible for one of these two things to not happen.
Later, we will look at the idea of using socratic leasehold
ownership in our system in Pastland. In
that system, we may eventually have billions of private properties. You might think it would be a lot of trouble
for us to go through each one and make sure the payments are made as
required. But, if we set up our system
the right way, we will never have to do this.
Our money will come in completely automatically and without any risk at
all, just as happened in Hawaii.
Frances is never going to send out a notice or bill for her leasehold
payment. She doesn’t have to. She doesn’t care if it is
missed. In fact, she would be happy
if it is missed: if this happens, her company will get an $8 million
windfall. (It will get $10 million
rather than $2 million.) She may have a dozen, a hundred, a thousand, or
even a million separate leaseholds out there.
As long as she sets them all up the same way, her company can never not
get its share of the value the land produces.
It is not possible for this money to not come in.
Selling Leaseholds
Say that you buy the leasehold to the Hawaii Farm. You paid $10 million for the price and have
agreed to pay $2 million for the leasehold payment. Note that your leasehold payment is exactly 20% of the price. Your price is exactly 5 times the leasehold
payment. (This is saying the exact same
thing two different ways.)
If you want to sell the land, you can sell it back to Castle
and Cooke for $10 million. You can also
offer it to some other party for some other amount. Obviously, it doesn’t make sense to sell it to anyone else unless
you can get more than $10 million from it. The leasehold agreement allows you to sell to anyone you want,
any time you want, for any price you want that is $10 million or higher. However, if you sell it for more than
$10 million, the leasehold payment for the new buyer will adjust upward to be
20% of the price you get, whatever it is.
For example, if you sell it for $12 million, the leasehold payment will
adjust upward to $2.4 million, which is 20% of $12 million.
Why did Frances put this provision into the contract?
Her company is in this land for the long run. The company has owned this land for more
than a century, longer than anyone alive on Earth has been on this world. The company never intends to get rid
of this land entirely. It wants to
benefit from this land for the rest of time.
The
next chapter discusses what happens if the human race is basically in the same
position as Castle and Cooke in this example and we decide to sell
partial rights to the land. We—the
members of the human race—are in it for the long run. We want to benefit from the existence of all private land for the
rest of time.
Frances put this provision into the contract because she
wants the company to benefit from the incentives that private buyers of
leaseholds have to improve properties.
If you buy and improve, you will make money. When you make money, she wants her company to make money too.
It may seem that you are getting the biggest part of the
benefits and the company is only getting crumbs. You get a one-time gain of $2 million. The company will only see its income go up by $200,000 a year,
and this increase won’t even start until after you sell. But remember that the company is in this for
the long run. Over the long run, it
will get far, far more benefits from the improvements than you will get. In the next century after the land is
improved, the company will get $20 million, or 10 times the amount you got.
If our group in Pastland sets up a system like this, we will
have created incentives that lead to improvements. These improvements will not just benefit the people who make
these improvements. They will make money
but since our income depends on the amount of money they make, the more money
they make, the more our income from the land will increase. We don’t have to just use this system for
the Pastland Farm: we can use it for any properties we want
improved. The buyers of the leaseholds
make benefits that seem huge initially and really are huge compared to
the incomes most people would otherwise get.
But when they make money, we make money. Since our increases in income last for the
rest of time, we will always get far more from improvements than any of the
private parties involved.
In Hawaii, Frances set up this system for a very specific
reason. She worked for a company that
was in business to make profits. If she
could drive up the profits of the company, she would be seen as a very valuable
employee. Castle and Cooke had a long
history of rewarding people who can drive up their profits with handsome
bonuses. She wanted to help her bosses
because she knew her bosses would reward her for this.
Frances is also going to set some common sense rules to
protect the land, just as the Forest Service sets rules to protect its
land. Frances wants to make sure no
chemicals are used on this land so it will remain uncontaminated. (Chemical-free rice sells for five times the
price of chemical-dependent rice and the chemical-free rice is getting rarer
and rarer, because chemical contamination is spreading in areas where rice is
commonly grown.) If she had sold a freehold on this land, she wouldn’t be
able to protect it; as soon as the land was sold, the new owner would be in
charge. But since she created a
leasehold, instead, she can protect this land for the rest of time.
Why Does Anyone Care About
Any of This?
We have seen that the societies you and I were born into are
diseased societies. They work in ways
that allow people to get very rich harming the land and harming other
people. The incentives of the individuals
in this society conflict with the interests of the human race.
These systems were not thought out. They weren’t the result of scientific
analysis. They basically evolved, and
they evolved in ways that often made them worse, not better. They started out very dangerous and
primitive, and they are just as dangerous, and nearly as primitive now as they
were when they were first formed.
These systems divide the land surface of the world into
entities we were raised to call ‘sovereign countries.’ The leaders of these
countries realized that if they could use their armies to ‘conquer’ land, they
could then generate revenue from this land in various different ways. They could gain personal wealth and power by
creating the conditions needed for wars to take place and then starting the
wars.
They hired experts to manipulate the emotions of the people
of their countries to make them feel the emotions needed for the war. If the experts the leaders hired could make
the people live in fear and believe that the people that they would be asked to
fight are horrible monsters worthy only of misery and death, the people would
be more likely to make the sacrifices needed for wars and to participate in the
wars. The leaders had powerful
incentives to find ways to generate hatred, fear, and the strange emotion
called ‘patriotism’ that makes people believe that the entity called their
‘country’ provides all wonderful things that exist and is worthy of any
sacrifices necessary to defeat the ones the leaders tell the people to hate.
Not all national leaders respond to these incentives.
Incentives are psychological pressures, like an invisible
hand pushing people to do certain things.
Many people thought the things the incentives were pushing them to do
were wrong and refused to do them, even though they could make themselves far
better off, gaining both wealth and power, if they responded to the
incentives. Not everyone responded, but
some did and that is all it takes.
The conditions necessary for war became a reality. Wars became constant.
In these systems, the people and organizations who have
control over the world and make day-to-day decisions over the land are notpartners
with the human race. The entity we call
the ‘human race’ has basically been banished, made to appear that it isn’t even
real and has no common interests, by the paid propagandists who work for the
individual clans/countries. The only
thing that matters is the territorial goals of the clans/countries; those who
think of the interests of the human race are traitors to their clans/countries
and are often rounded up and disposed of.
These systems are hundred percent ownability systems,
meaning that everything is ownable and owned (by some clan, country,
corporation, commune, collective, or individual). Nothing is unowned and available for the members of the
human race to use to meet the common needs of our race.
If we had anything at all; if any share of the
wealth that flows from the land was unowned and available for us to control, we
would have some power and some control over the important
variables of our existence. But the
people who built the societies that were here when we were born didn’t consider
the needs of the human race, they considered only their instincts,
superstitions, and beliefs about the invisible beings and unseen forces that
they thought created a mandate for them to take the land and hold it.
We can’t do anything about the past.
We can’t do anything about the way the world worked when we
were born.
But time has passed.
The people who set up this dangerous system are long
dead. The people who were in charge are
going away leaving new generations. The
old beliefs are dying quickly, as technology makes information about objective
analysis available to everyone. We can
decide to try to keep the old beliefs alive if we want. We can choose to not allow ourselves
to look at the world differently than people in the past. We can choose to not allow our
children to know they have the right to think about the world the way they want
and make it work they way they want.
But we can also make a break from the past. We can accept that there are many different
paths that we can take into the future.
We can analyze the landscape, figure out where the different paths go,
and find one that leads to the type of world that we want to live in, and that
we want our children and their children to be able to enjoy.
We are now in a position to do the analysis that the past
generations that created this dangerous system were not willing, and not even
really able to do. We have tools
that include computers and the internet that can help us categorize the old
beliefs and instinctual feelings as what they are: remnants of a primitive
past. We can accept that we have the ability
to set up systems that allow people to buy rights to the world in ways that
give them rights to do things that benefit the human race and allow them to get
rich if they do these things, without also having the rights to do
things that harm our world and put our race and our world at risk.
How do we put such a system into place?
Before we can even think about such things, we have to know
this: ‘What system are we trying to put into place?'
You can’t plan a journey until you have first decided
on a destination.
We can’t determine the specific steps we need to take to
change our societies until we know how we want our societies to work after the
changes are complete.
The very first step that we must take is to figure out what
characteristics human societies must have in order for them to be ‘healthy’
societies and able to meet the needs of the human race.
I know it is hard to imagine us making a transition from the
societies we have now to sane, stable, peaceful, sustainable, and otherwise
healthy societies. This is so hard to
imagine that most people just want to give up on everything and not think about
the issue. It causes real mental pain
to think about and we naturally want to avoid pain, so we don’t think about
it. But if we don’t think about things,
we will never figure them out. We will
never figure out how to get to healthy societies if we don’t know what
healthy societies look like.
Once we understand how healthy societies work, and we have a
destination in mind, we can start to consider what we must change about the
societies that our primitive ancestors put into place to get from where we are
now to the destination we have in mind.
We will look at the idea of societal change in great detail
much later in the book. We will see
that if we understand exactly where we want to go and know exactly what we must
change to get there, the changes themselves are actually pretty easy. If you know where you want to go and have a
map that shows how to get there, it is pretty easy to plan a route.
The
illustration on the back cover is called a ‘Road Map of Possible
Societies.’ It shows the terrain.
The society that is explained in the next few chapters is called a
‘Democratic Socratic’ and is on the center line of the map toward the far right
end. The bottom line is marked
‘Sovereignty-based Societies’ and we are close to the center of this line, at
the point marked ‘we are here now.’ The trip we would have to take to get
there would be marked by a line that connects these two points.
We must take this project one step at a time. The first step is to understand our
capabilities. If we know that healthy
societies are within our capabilities, we have taken the first step. We will then be willing to take the
second step and do an analysis of the possibilities. We will see that a great many arrangements of human societies are
fundamentally healthy. We can narrow
down the options by looking for the specific healthy society that is the
closest to the societies we have now, and therefore the easiest to get to.
Only after we know where we are going are we in a position
to plan the trip itself. This, I believe,
is the reason that attempts at societal change in the past have failed: the
people who tried them didn’t have a destination in mind, they only knew they
didn’t like what they had. (Marx
basically said, ‘Kill all the evil owners and bureaucrats and destroy
everything they have built; when the evil ones are gone, the good people who
are left will figure out something better and put it into place.’ He had
no idea about the destination and made entirely wrong guesses about how to get
to better societies.)
The Pastland example is designed to make it easy to see that
healthy societies really are possible.
You and I and the rest of the people in our group are in a position to
start from scratch. We can form any
kind of society we want. We have
incredible advantages, including all of the technology of the 21st
century, the skills of our time, and all information about the things that have
been tried over the last iteration of history and the way they worked out. We can take advantage of these things. We are in a position to form any kind of
society we want.
We have Frances and other people with skills and talents
that can help us. Let’s go back to
Pastland and consider what would happen if we decided to intentionally organize
our society around a method of interacting with the land that was designed to
align the interests of the people who control land with the interests of the
human race as a whole. We will see that
it is quite possible for humans to live in a healthy, sane, peaceful,
prosperous society. Once we know it is
possible and we have a potential destination in mind, all we have to do is
decide if we want to go there and then make the trip.
Endnote 1
The
farm can’t sell for more than $60 million and can’t sell for less than
$60 million so there is only one price it can sell for, if interest rates are
4%: $60 million. Let’s first consider
why it can’t sell for more than this:
If
a buyer had to borrow to pay the price, she only has a certain amount of money
to make the payment: the free cash flow.
She can’t make a higher payment than $2.4 million because there
is no more money: all of the rest of production above the free cash flow is
needed to pay costs or compensate professionals for their organization and
management. She can only afford to pay
up to the price where the payment will be $2.4 million (equal to the free cash
flow) and no more. The exact price
where this happens is $60 million.
A
buyer paying cash wouldn’t be able to offer any more money either. If you have $60 million in an investment
that pays 4%, you will be giving up $2.4 million a year in returns on your $60
million. You can only break even on
this investment if you can pay a price that is such that you give up no more
than the free cash flow. If you pay
exactly $60 million (again, assuming return rates are 4%) you give up exactly
$2.4 million and get the free money from the farm, or $2.4 million, to replace
it. Pay more than $60 million for this
farm and you are going to be losing money from day one. People can’t afford investments that lose
them money so no one with money can afford this investment at any price higher
than $60 million.
Now
consider the other side of the coin: why can’t it sell for less than $60
million?
The
reason is greed. If it is offered for less
than $60 million, anyone with good credit can borrow the full price, collect
the $2.4 million free cash flow of this farm, turn over less than this
amount as their loan payment, and pocket the rest of the free money. For example, say it is offered for $50
million. You can borrow this money for
4% (assuming you have good credit), make the $2 million payment, and pocket
$400,000 a year without doing a single thing and without investing a single
dime of your own money. Who would like
to get $400,000 a year in totally free money without effort or any personal
investment? The answer is: everyone.
If the farm is offered for a figure that allows people to get free money
without effort or personal investment everyone who can get the loan will want
it. People will bid against each other
for it, offering a higher price. The
price has to go up as long as it is such that people can get free money without
effort or investment. In other words,
as long as the price is less than $60 million, it must go up. It can’t go higher than this, so the
freehold rights to this farm will sell for $60 million, or some figure so close
to $60 million that any difference isn’t important for practical purposes.
Endnote 2
The
logic for what happens in this system is basically the same as the logic for
the price of a freehold which produced a free cash flow of $2.399,999, rather
than the full $2.4 million. The buyer
is not buying the right to the full $2.4 million of free money, she is only buying
the right to $2,399,999. As a result,
she can’t afford to pay more than the price that would make her mortgage
payment $2,399,999. This price is
$59,999,975.
Endnote 3
The
buyer is buying the right to $400,000 a year of free cash. The farm produces $2.4 million, but $2
million of this will continue to go to the landlord and is not for sale; only
the right to the other $400,000 is for sale.
She can afford a mortgage payment up to the $400,000, and no more. A price of $10 million leads to a payment of
$400,000 if interest rates are 4%, so she can’t afford more than $10
million. Many people would like to buy
for a price lower than $10 million because, if they did, their mortgage payment
would be lower than $400,000 and they could put the other free money into their
pockets. Since no one is willing to pay
more than $10 million and everyone is willing to pay up to $10 million, the
leasehold rights to the farm will sell for $10 million, or some figure so close
to $10 million that any difference isn’t important for practical purposes.